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| Author(s): | Litschig, Stephan Zamboni, Yves |
| Title: | The effect of judicial institutions on local governance and corruption |
| Issue Date: | 2007-Aug-8 |
| Keywords: | law enforcement JEL Code: H75 corruption JEL Code: K42 local governance JEL Code: M42 institutions |
| Series no.: | Discussion Paper 0607-15 |
| Bookmark as: | http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:434 |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance and corruption in local governments. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches in Brazil which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents. |
| Collection(s): | Economics Discussion Papers |
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