http://app.cul.columbia.edu:8080/ac/handle/10022/AC:P:29795 Search the Channel search http://app.cul.columbia.edu:8080/ac/simple-search http://app.cul.columbia.edu:8080/ac/handle/10022/AC:P:29803 Title: Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of Professor Moore <br/> <br/>Author(s): Gitter, Donna M. <br/> <br/>Abstract: The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit currently reverses from one-third to nearly one-half of all U.S. district court patent claim construction decisions. Because claim construction often determines the outcome of patent litigation, the high appellate claim construction reversal rate contributes to significant uncertainty among inventors and investors. Congress is currently considering legislation, H.R. 628, which will designate specialist district court patent judges to reduce this unacceptably high reversal rate. This Article concludes that designation of specialist patent trial judges among the federal district court judiciary is likely to reduce the high appellate claim construction reversal rate, based upon an empirical analysis of the appellate claim construction reversal rate in England, which has specialized patent tribunals. Part I of the Article examines proposed U.S. legislation that would designate specialized patent trial judges. Part II analyzes the patent claim construction process in the United States, enumerating the challenges faced by generalist U.S. district court judges charged with deciding highly complex patent litigation actions. Part III then examines the English patent claim construction process, drawing numerous parallels between patent litigation in the United States and England that render the English system a valid comparator when considering the respective appellate claim construction reversal rates in the two jurisdictions. Part IV presents empirical results that strongly support the notion that designation of specialist patent trial judges in the United States could indeed decrease the appellate claim construction reversal rate, thereby affording certainty to patent litigants and investors. Part V then explains why the approach proposed in H.R. 628 is superior to the current English system of specialized patent trial courts. Thu, 14 May 2009 22:58:59 GMT http://app.cul.columbia.edu:8080/ac/handle/10022/AC:P:29802 Title: Patent Insurance: Towards a More Affordable, Mandatory Scheme? <br/> <br/>Author(s): Fuentes, J. Rodrigo <br/> <br/>Abstract: Even though businesses insure against myriad risks, patent litigation is often excluded from their general commercial liability insurance policy. Companies understand that patent litigation is an expensive ordeal, and some opt for specialized patent insurance. However, most businesses do not carry such protection because it is too costly. This is unfortunate because some studies suggest that patent insurance fosters research and development among small-to-medium sized enterprises. Following this finding, the European Commission called on CJA Consultants to study the feasibility of a mandatory, EU-wide patent insurance scheme in early 2003. In 2006, CJA Consultants concluded that such a scheme was feasible. This Note analyzes the mandatory patent insurance scheme proposed by CJA Consultants and considers whether a similar scheme could be implemented in the United States. First, the Note provides a background on patent insurance. Then, actual policy specimens from a patent insurer are analyzed to explain the differing types of insurance, their costs, and their shortcomings. Ultimately, the CJA Consultants’ proposal is analyzed and compared to the identified shortcomings. The Note concludes that a mandatory U.S. patent insurance scheme would fail. Thu, 14 May 2009 22:58:59 GMT http://app.cul.columbia.edu:8080/ac/handle/10022/AC:P:29801 Title: Contract Formation in an Internet Age <br/> <br/>Author(s): Rawls, Amelia <br/> <br/>Abstract: Should the “mailbox” doctrine of contract acceptances be applied in technological contexts far beyond the nineteenth century context for which it was established? Among modern contracting parties, the e-mail inbox has largely replaced the postal mailbox and the near-instantaneous process of electronic communication can mimic the characteristics of a face-to-face discussion. Such technological advancements of the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries pose a challenge to the doctrinal and normative rationales articulated by the Adams v. Lindsell court and other early “mailbox” rule advocates. Moreover, the advent of electronic communication has implications even for application of the “mailbox” precedent within the framework of postal and other traditional communication systems. Only a receipt-based contracting precedent, applied to technologies both new and old, can properly enhance inter-jurisdictional legal uniformity and incentivize efficient contracting behavior. Thu, 14 May 2009 22:58:59 GMT http://app.cul.columbia.edu:8080/ac/handle/10022/AC:P:29800 Title: Patents and The Regress of Useful Arts <br/> <br/>Author(s): Torrance, Andrew W.; Tomlinson, Bill <br/> <br/>Abstract: Patent systems are often justified by an assumption that innovation will be spurred by the prospect of patent protection, leading to the accrual of greater societal benefits than would be possible under non-patent systems. However, little empirical evidence exists to support this assumption. One way to test the hypothesis that a patent system promotes innovation is to simulate the behavior of inventors and competitors experimentally under conditions approximating patent and non-patent systems. Employing a multi-user interactive simulation of patent and non-patent (commons and open source) systems (“PatentSim”), this study compares rates of innovation, productivity, and societal utility. PatentSim uses an abstracted and cumulative model of the invention process, a database of potential innovations, an interactive interface that allows users to invent, patent, or open source these innovations, and a network over which users may interact with one another to license, assign, buy, infringe, and enforce patents. Data generated thus far using PatentSim suggest that a system combining patent and open source protection for inventions (that is, similar to modern patent systems) generates significantly lower rates of innovation (p<0.05), productivity (p<0.001), and societal utility (p<0.002) than does a commons system. These data also indicate that there is no statistical difference in innovation, productivity, or societal utility between a pure patent system and a system combining patent and open source protection. The results of this study are inconsistent with the orthodox justification for patent systems. However, they do accord well with evidence from the increasingly important field of user and open innovation. Simulation games of the patent system could even provide a more effective means of fulfilling the Constitutional mandate “to promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts” than does the orthodox assumption that technological innovation can be encouraged through the prospect of patent protection. Thu, 14 May 2009 22:58:59 GMT